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The depiction of Australia’s strategic environment in the 2013 Defence White Paper has been 
one of its most favourably received elements.  This article examines the White Paper’s 
treatment of China’s rise, and of the US-China relationship, the newly introduced construct 
known as the ‘Indo-Pacific strategic arc’, and the White Paper’s renewed focus on defence 
engagement with Indonesia, and with Southeast Asia more generally, highlighting some of the 
challenges of this approach.  While acknowledging the favourable reception that much of the 
analysis contained in the 2013 White Paper has received, the article concludes by observing 
that it may have over-corrected trying to redress the shortcomings of its 2009 predecessor.   
Recasting China’s Rise 
The depiction of China in the 2009 White Paper was arguably its most 
contentious aspect.  The 2009 paper gave prominence to “the strategic 
implications of the rise of China”, assigning it a separate section.  China was 
predicted to become “the strongest Asian military power, by a considerable 
margin.”  Central to its military modernization would be “the development of 
power projection capabilities.”  This modernization was adjudged in the 2009 
White Paper as being “beyond the scope of what would be required for a 
conflict over Taiwan” and a potential “cause for concern” amongst China’s 
neighbours.
1
  The 2009 iteration also referred to the prospect of “major 
power adversaries operating in our approaches”, a judgment that 
commentators unanimously took as referring to China.
2
 
Arguably the biggest headline from the 2013 White Paper is the ostensibly 
softer tone and approach it takes towards depicting China. In the 2013 
iteration, “Australia welcomes China’s rise” and “does not approach China as 
an adversary.”  It goes on to characterize China’s military modernization as 
“a natural and legitimate outcome of its economic growth.”
3
  Yet as a number 
of commentators have observed, despite this softer tone there remains 
beneath the surface of the 2013 White Paper a ‘sting in the tail’ as far as its 
strategic depiction of China is concerned.  Rory Medcalf of the Lowy Institute 
for International Policy, for example, observes that  
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buried in all that sweetness, it says plainly that Australia may need to be 
prepared to ‘conduct combat operations to counter aggression or coercion 
against our partners.’  That can mean many things, but one of them remains 
the possibility, however remote, of joining a US-led war against China.
4
  
In similar vein, Amy King points out that the new White Paper makes 
frequent mention of Asia’s flashpoints, with China providing a central focus:   
the White Paper is exceedingly clear that these territorial disputes in 
Southeast and Northeast Asia are directly linked to regional states’ 
concerns about China’s military modernization.
5
 
Unlike the 2009 White Paper, however, the 2013 version deals with China 
and the United States in tandem, rather than allocating separate sections.  
Consistent with the January 2013 National Security Strategy, which 
described the US-China relationship as “the single most influential force in 
shaping the strategic environment”,
6
 the 2013 White Paper suggests that 
“more than any other, the relationship between the United States and China 
will determine the outlook for our region.”  While acknowledging that some 
strategic competition between these two regional heavyweights is 
“inevitable”, the new White Paper is remarkably upbeat on relations between 
Beijing and Washington.  It predicts their most likely future as being “one in 
which the United States and China are able to maintain a constructive 
relationship encompassing both competition and cooperation.”
7
  And in what 
appears to be a response to the arguments of Hugh White, it asserts that  
the Government does not believe that Australia must choose between its 
longstanding Alliance with the United States and its expanding relationship 




While acknowledging that the future of the US-China relationship will be 
characterized by a mix of competition and cooperation, the 2013 White 
Paper does not specify what the balance between these two opposing ends 
of the spectrum might look like.   
The assessments underpinning the 2013 White Paper are rather positive in 
this regard, seeming to imply that cooperation and the successful 
management of competitive tendencies are likely to prevail.  That is certainly 
one conceivable scenario, but only one amongst many possible Sino-US 
security futures.  A widely cited report produced recently under the auspices 
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of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for instance, outlines no 
less than six possible strategic environments that could emerge over the 
next two decades as a consequence of different trajectories pursued by the 
US, China and Japan.
9
  To be sure, because the primary purpose of a White 
Paper is to outline a new policy direction, with accompanying reasoning and 
evidence to support that direction, it cannot afford to be as comprehensively 
equivocal as a lengthy policy report issued by a think tank or academic 
institution.  Nevertheless, so as to acknowledge and ‘hedge’ against the 
range of possible futures in US-China relations, greater care could still have 
been taken in the wording of the 2013 White Paper to reflect this reality. 
An ‘Indo-Pacific Strategic Arc’ 
Whereas the 2009 White Paper gave prominence to the term ‘Asia-Pacific’, 
including in its title, to highlight Australia’s area of priority strategic focus, the 
2013 iteration shifted this focus by introducing a ‘new’ strategic construct 
referred to as the ‘Indo-Pacific strategic arc.’  Use of this term was not 
unexpected.  In the months leading up to the White Paper’s release, 
Defence Minister Stephan Smith had delivered several high profile speeches 
giving considerable attention to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ idea.  Foreshadowing the 
direction of the White Paper in an August 2012 speech to the Lowy Institute 
for International Policy, for example, the Minister suggested that the Indo-
Pacific was emerging as “the world’s centre of gravity”, not least because it 
“will be home to three of the world’s superpowers – the United States, China 
and India.”
10
  The January 2013 National Security Strategy had also made 
passing reference to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct.
11
 
However, the focus given to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ in the 2013 White Paper was 
much sharper and of greater prominence than that afforded in the National 
Security Strategy.  Peter Jennings cautioned the reader in this regard:  
don’t be fooled by the language stressing continuity between this document 
on the one hand and the Asian Century White Paper and National Security 
Strategy on the other.  Of these three, the White Paper reflects by far the 
most sophisticated approach. 
Of the Indo-Pacific, Jennings went on to observe that it represents a  
far more realistic way to think about our interests than the Asian Century 
White Paper’s approach, which is to emphasize a narrow set of 
relationships with a limited number of countries.
12
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Jennings’ comparison of the National Security Strategy and the 2013 White 
Paper is an apt one.  Of the two, the former is particularly loose in its use of 
the ‘Indo-Pacific’ terminology, contending that  
to define Australia’s strategic setting … use of the term “Indo-Pacific” 
complements the term “Asia-Pacific”—they are both useful frames through 
which to view Australia’s national security interests.
13
  
In reality, such an approach arguably serves to undermine the sense of 
coherence that the Gillard Government had been seeking to achieve by 
releasing a trio of White Papers in such close succession. 
What distinguishes the 2013 White Paper’s characterization of Australia’s 
strategic environment in this regard is its depiction of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ as a 
‘strategic arc.’  Such a depiction is reminiscent of Paul Dibb’s ‘arc of 
instability’ which with Dibb used to describe the area that  
stretches from the Indonesian archipelago, Timor Leste and Papua New 
Guinea in the North, to the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, New Caledonia 
and New Zealand in the East.
14
 
A similar degree of precision is not quite attained in the 2013 White Paper, 
which provides a more general characterization of the Indo-Pacific strategic 
arc as covering the area “extending from India th[r]ough Southeast Asia to 
Northeast Asia, including the sea lines of communication on which the region 
depends.”
15
  Nevertheless, the utility of referring to the Indo-Pacific as a 
‘strategic arc’ lies in the fact that it potentially allows specification of where 
the Indo-Pacific begins, which key players it encompasses, and where it 
ultimately ends.  This constitutes a useful step forward. 
From a purely Australian perspective, the Indo-Pacific construct is one that 
seems worth persevering with when thinking about Asia’s evolving strategic 
environment.  As the 2013 White Paper notes, achieving or even influencing 
strategic outcomes is going to become more difficult for Australia in this 
increasingly complex environment: “Asian countries will balance a broader 
range of interests and partners, and Australia’s voice will need to be clearer 
and stronger to be heard.”
16
  Against that backdrop, because the Indo-Pacific 
construct places Australia at the very centre of the region, there is certainly 
some political mileage to be gained from encouraging potential strategic 
partners—particularly India and Indonesia—to think in such terms. 
Convincing New Delhi to buy into the Indo-Pacific construct ought not to be 
very demanding, in the light of evidence that Indian strategic thinkers are 
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readily embracing the term.
17
  Beyond this, however, achieving broader 
regional ‘buy in’ could be problematic.  It was interesting to note that at the 
June 2013 gathering of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, for instance, 
Australian Defence Minister Stephan Smith was the only official to use the 
term while addressing the plenary sessions.
18
  Beijing certainly appears less 
than enamoured by the Indo-Pacific descriptor, perceiving it to be 
synonymous with America’s ‘rebalancing’ strategy.  Somewhat ironically, 
Washington’s embrace of the term has been less than enthusiastic also, 
most likely due to the fact, as Michael Green and Andrew Shearer have 
recently observed, that American leadership in the Indian Ocean does not 
constitute a core US interest.
19
 
The expansion of Australia’s strategic focus during a period of growing 
budgetary pressures could also be problematic.  Indeed, unless and until 
defence funding returns to the aspirational level of 2 percent of GDP stated 
in the White Paper—an outcome most commentators regard as unlikely for 
the foreseeable future—a strong case can be made that the expansion of 
Australia’s strategic ambitions into the broader Indo-Pacific risks stretching 
our already strained resources dangerously thin. 
Engaging Southeast Asia 
Militating against this latter criticism is the prominence given to Southeast 
Asia in the 2013 White Paper’s depiction of Australia’s strategic 
environment.  Southeast Asia is described as being at the “geographic 
centre” of the emerging Indo-Pacific system, while a number of key 
institutions led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—the 
East Asia Summit, the ‘ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-plus’ and the 
ASEAN Regional Forum—are portrayed as “establishing some of the 
positive foundations needed for regional security.”
20
 
Historically, of course, Southeast Asia’s strategic geography has been 
regarded as presenting opportunities and challenges for Australian strategic 
policy, being both a shield from the great power machinations of Northeast 
Asia and as a source of potential vulnerability due to the Southeast Asian 
sub-region’s porosity.  Southeast Asian fragility, particularly that of 
Indonesia, was highlighted in the 2009 White Paper, which observed that  
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a weak, fragmented Indonesia beset by intractable communal problems, 
poverty and failing state institutions, would potentially be a source of threat 
to our own security and to Indonesia’s other neighbours.
21
 
By contrast, Indonesian strength is emphasised in the 2013 White Paper, 
which describes Australia’s “partnership” with Indonesia as “our most 
important defence relationship in the region”, and includes the judgement 
that “Indonesia’s success as a democracy and its economic growth will see it 
emerge as one of the world’s major economies.”
22
 
The prominence given to Southeast Asia, particularly to Indonesia, in the 
2013 White Paper was, once again, not unexpected.  The relatively thin 
National Security Strategy devotes an entire page to the topic, for instance, 
and observes that “Maintaining the positive trajectory of that relationship is a 
priority.”
23
  Placing such heavy emphasis on Australia’s bilateral relationship 
with Indonesia, whilst simultaneously conceiving of the Southeast Asian sub-
region more generally as a critical hinge between the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans, is not entirely unproblematic.  Indonesia’s relationship with its 
Southeast Asian neighbours is a complex one.  On the one hand, Indonesia 
is regarded by many if not most of its neighbours as the natural leader of 
ASEAN.  At the same time, the smaller and medium sized countries of 
Southeast Asia remain suspicious regarding the potential for rising Indonesia 
to seek to operate beyond the confines of this organisation.  Prominent 
Indonesian intellectuals such as Rizal Sukma have fuelled these fears by 
advocating the establishment of a post-ASEAN Indonesian foreign policy.
24
 
Jakarta’s cultivation of deeper defence ties with Canberra could play further 
into these apprehensions, potentially complicating Australia’s Southeast 
Asian engagement in the process.  Tim Huxley cautioned that 
Canberra should not neglect its other defence relationships in Southeast 
Asia as these provide crucial depth to regional engagement and also a 
hedge against any future complications or cooling ties with Jakarta.
25
 
The 2013 White Paper is arguably also too optimistic in its depiction of 
Southeast Asia’s strategic environment and, consequentially, the extent to 
which Australia will be able to continue to deepen its defence engagement 
with countries in this part of the world.  There is an assumption, for example, 
that the countries of Southeast Asia will adopt an increasingly outward 
looking posture as the Asian century unfolds.  As the 2013 White Paper 
suggests with reference to Indonesia, for instance, “Indonesia’s importance 
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to Australia will grow as its significant regional influence becomes global.”
26
  
However, as promising as Indonesia’s economic growth rates are presently, 
it will be some time yet before Jakarta has the capacity to exert significant 
influence regionally, let alone globally—at least as far as its military is 
concerned.  Benjamin Schreer recently observed that “The Indonesian 
armed forces are decades away from developing independent capabilities 
sufficient to protect Jakarta’s maritime interests.”
27
  
Furthermore, a longstanding tradition of non-alignment remains deeply 
embedded in the Indonesian psyche, which is likely also to serve as a 
powerful constraint upon ever deepening defence engagement between 
Canberra and Jakarta.  As Huxley goes on to observe: 
Indonesia’s strong tradition of non-alignment, rooted in the strong but 
defensive nationalism that pervades its political culture and manifest in its 
“independent and active” foreign policy and Jakarta’s central role in efforts 
through ASEAN to build a regional community in Southeast Asia and the 
broader Asia-Pacific, militates against any form of defence cooperation that 
might be seen as a proto-alliance.
28
    
Similarly strong non-aligned proclivities are a feature of many if not most 
countries in Southeast Asia.  One could even make the case that they are 
essentially hard-wired onto the ‘strategic DNA’ of these countries, which in 
turn offers one possible explanation for the prevalence of the ‘hedging’ 
strategies that the vast majority of Southeast Asian governments have 
evidently adopted in the face of China’s rise.
29
 
Last but not least, the Australian refocus towards Southeast Asia contained 
in the 2013 White Paper is also occurring against the backdrop of the 
Obama administration’s ‘pivot’ or ‘re-balancing’ to the Asia-Pacific.  
Notwithstanding the continued closeness of the longstanding alliance 
between Australia and America—a strategic tie which the White Paper 
describes as “our most important defence relationship”
30
—some care must 
be taken to differentiate Canberra’s ‘pivot’ from that of its American 
counterparts.  The US ‘re-balancing’ strategy itself has a strong Southeast 
Asia focus, thus far involving the deployment of Littoral Combat Ships to 
Singapore, the deepening of strategic ties with Indonesia and Vietnam, and 
the reinforcing of the US-Philippines alliance, including increased American 
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port calls to the former US base in Subic Bay and Washington’s supplying of 
Manila with surplus US military equipment.
31
 
Product differentiation with the US re-balancing strategy is important for 
Canberra, particularly in relation to Southeast Asia.  For while the alliance 
undeniably adds to Australia’s strategic weight in this region, instances 
where Canberra has been seen to be mimicking US policy have traditionally 
not played well in this part of the world.  President George W. Bush’s 2003 
characterization of Australia as the ‘deputy sheriff’ to America in the Asia-
Pacific, along with the Howard Government’s echoing of Bush administration 
rhetoric with suggestions that Canberra would consider pre-emptive strikes 
against Southeast Asian terrorists in order to prevent a terrorist attack on 
Australia, serve as cases in point.
32
   
Conclusions 
These shortcomings notwithstanding, the 2013 White Paper’s depiction of 
Australia’s strategic environment has generally been regarded as sound and 
broadly sustainable.  In particular, its treatment of China’s rise has been 
reviewed in far more favourable terms than the 2009 White Paper, which 
was generally seen as being too alarmist.  The treatment of the US-China 
relationship has been praised for its nuanced approach towards this 
relationship, and for its assertion that Canberra does not have to choose 
between these two regional heavyweights. 
All of that said, just as the adversarial approach of the 2009 White Paper 
proved to be its undoing, so too might the considerably more optimistic tone 
of the 2013 iteration represent a vulnerability.  By implying that the 
cooperative elements of the US-China relationship will ultimately trump its 
competitive potential, the new White Paper may be underestimating the 
deepening strategic competition already emerging between China and the 
United States.  By emphasising an Indo-Pacific construct that few other 
countries are likely to adopt, the new White Paper may be going down a 
dead-end.  Likewise, the optimism of the new White Paper may also be 
underestimating some of the limits to deeper defence engagement with 
Indonesia and the Southeast Asian sub-region more generally. 
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